Results at a glance
- Period
- FY2026Q3
- Revenue
- $3.7B (3,704 MUSD)
- Net income
- $483M (483 MUSD)
- Net margin
- 13.0%
From the Alcoa Open LedgerView the live ledgerIssuer filing (FY2026Q3)
On October 15, 2026, Alcoa reported third-quarter net income of $483 million, more than double the $232 million of a year ago — on revenue that fell 6.6% sequentially to $3.70 billion. Read the balance sheet next to the income statement and the quarter snaps into focus: cash tripled to $4.41 billion on $2.6 billion of newly issued notes, parked and waiting for the $3.1 billion cash leg of the AliGroup acquisition. This is the quarter Alcoa loaded the balance sheet for the biggest bet in its history as an independent company.
The Headline Numbers
Alcoa's fiscal year is the calendar year; Q3 2026 ended September 30, 2026. Every figure below comes from the Form 8-K and its earnings release (Exhibit 99.1), which carries unaudited income-statement and balance-sheet exhibits — no Form 10-Q for the quarter had been filed as of October 20, so the 8-K exhibits are the primary source.
| Metric | Q3 2026 | Q2 2026 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3,704M | $3,966M | $2,995M |
| Net income | $483M | $407M | $232M |
| Diluted EPS | $1.81 | $1.53 | $0.88 |
| Adjusted net income | $485M | $562M | $(6)M |
| Adjusted EBITDA ex. special items | $789M | $901M | $270M |
| Cash from operations | $643M | $608M | $85M |
| Free cash flow | $472M | $422M | $(66)M |
Two stories run side by side here, and the headlines only tell one of them. Year over year, everything improved: revenue up 23.7%, net income more than doubled, free cash flow swung from negative $66 million to positive $472 million. Sequentially, the operating trend softened: revenue down 6.6%, adjusted net income down 13.7% to $485 million, adjusted EBITDA down $112 million to $789 million. What reconciles the two is that GAAP net income rose $76 million sequentially while every adjusted measure fell — the difference is mark-to-market gains that landed in GAAP but are stripped out of the adjusted figures. Favorable mark-to-market changes on energy contracts ($32 million) and the Ma'aden shares ($28 million), plus improved production costs and higher alumina prices, more than covered lower aluminum prices and shipments on a GAAP basis.
The GAAP-to-adjusted bridge is unusually clean this quarter — net special items of just $2 million:
| GAAP → adjusted bridge, Q3 2026 | USD millions |
|---|---|
| Net income attributable (GAAP) | $483M |
| Restructuring and other charges | $18M |
| Other special items | $(22)M |
| Discrete and other tax items | $0M |
| Tax impact on special items | $6M |
| Adjusted net income | $485M |
Compare that with the year-ago quarter, when $885 million of restructuring charges and a $786 million gain on the Ma'aden joint-venture sale shoved GAAP and adjusted earnings $238 million apart. Q3 2026 is the rare Alcoa quarter where the two bottom lines agree — which makes it the right quarter to ask what the clean number is actually made of.
Revenue Deep Dive
Alcoa reports two segments, and they moved in opposite directions. Alumina grew; aluminum shrank; aluminum is four times the size, so the total fell.
| Segment | Q3 2026 third-party sales | Q2 2026 | Adj. EBITDA Q3 | Adj. EBITDA Q2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alumina | $680M | $637M | $(1)M | $(96)M |
| Aluminum | $3,021M | $3,330M | $862M | $1,073M |
Alumina's 7% revenue gain came the honest way: production up 11% sequentially to 2.47 million metric tons on improved stability at the Pinjarra refinery in Australia, third-party shipments up 2%, and the average realized price up nearly 6% to $353 per ton. The release credits "higher average realized alumina prices and shipments" directly. But note what the segment table screams: $680 million of sales produced negative $1 million of adjusted EBITDA. The segment's average operating cost was $354 per ton of alumina shipped — one dollar above its selling price. Improved from the second quarter's $34-per-ton deficit, but still a business running at cost.
Aluminum is the mirror image: production up 2% to a sixth consecutive quarterly increase, yet revenue down 9% because shipments fell 5% (against an elevated second quarter that had absorbed first-quarter inventory repositioning) and the realized price slipped nearly 5% to $4,527 per ton. The release is explicit that "lower shipments and average realized prices" drove the decline. At $862 million of adjusted EBITDA on $3,021 million of sales — a 28.5% margin — aluminum remains the entire profit engine. Alumina is the drag it tows.
On the management-signal scan, this release is strikingly quiet. There is no "demand exceeds supply," no "robust demand," no upcycle language anywhere in the release — for a commodity producer, the absence of demand commentary is itself the signal. What management chose to say instead is operational: record year-to-date production at five smelters and one refinery, the completed Alumar smelter restart in Brazil, and CEO William Oplinger's forward focus on "strengthening safety performance, sustaining operational stability, and building on this momentum as we work toward closing the AliGroup acquisition." This is a management team talking about what it controls — tons and stability — because price is set in London, not Pittsburgh.
The Margin Story
Four quarters of margins show a company that fixed its cost base while its selling prices stayed hostage to the cycle:
| Margin | Q3 2025 | Q1 2026 | Q2 2026 | Q3 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross | 10.0% | 21.3% | 25.2% | 23.8% |
| Operating | 1.7% | 13.3% | 18.0% | 16.2% |
| Net (attributable) | 7.7% | 13.3% | 10.3% | 13.0% |
The year-over-year expansion is mechanical and real: cost of goods sold grew just 4.7% against 23.7% revenue growth, as the smelter restarts and refinery stability spread fixed costs over more tons. Gross margin more than doubled from 10.0% to 23.8%. The sequential slip from 25.2% to 23.8% is the aluminum price decline flowing straight through — when your realized price falls $225 a ton and your cost per ton rises $103 (as aluminum's did, to $2,584), the margin compresses from both ends at once.
Net margin tells the GAAP-vs-reality story of this company. At 13.0%, it exceeds operating margin flow-through because of the below-the-line items: $32 million of other income (the energy and Ma'aden mark-to-market gains) and a tax provision of just $91 million on $573 million of pre-tax income — a 15.9% effective rate, reflecting Alcoa's jurisdictional mix. A year ago the relationship inverted: net margin of 7.7% exceeded a 1.7% operating margin by six full points, because the $786 million Ma'aden sale gain sat below the operating line. Whenever Alcoa's net margin beats its operating margin by a wide spread, look below the line first. This quarter the spread is narrow, which is the healthiest version of this company.
The One Big Question: Why Double Down on Alumina While Alumina Earns Nothing?
The quarter's defining event is not in the income statement at all. On September 23, Alcoa issued $1.5 billion of 6.625% notes due 2034 and $1.1 billion of 6.875% notes due 2036, and on October 15 — the same day as earnings — South32 shareholders approved Alcoa's acquisition of South32's bauxite, alumina, and aluminum assets, the package Alcoa calls AliGroup. The cash consideration is approximately $3.1 billion, the $2.6 billion of note proceeds are already sitting in cash, the bridge financing is terminated, and closing is expected in the first half of 2027. Full-year interest expense guidance rose to approximately $185 million on the new notes.
Here is the tension. AliGroup is substantially an alumina-and-bauxite deal — it doubles down on the upstream half of Alcoa's integrated model. And the upstream half currently earns nothing. Watch the alumina price-cost spread evaporate over seven quarters (spread is simply the release's realized price less its adjusted operating cost per ton, my arithmetic on filed figures):
| Quarter | Realized alumina price/mt | Adjusted cost/mt | Implied spread |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 2025 | $575 | $312 | $263 |
| Q2 2025 | $378 | $323 | $55 |
| Q3 2025 | $377 | $318 | $59 |
| Q4 2025 | $341 | $314 | $27 |
| Q1 2026 | $324 | $334 | $(10) |
| Q2 2026 | $334 | $368 | $(34) |
| Q3 2026 | $353 | $354 | $(1) |
The alumina price collapsed 39% from early 2025 while unit costs rose 13%, and the segment's adjusted EBITDA went from $664 million in Q1 2025 to zero. Alcoa is buying more of exactly this exposure. The bull case is that this is precisely when to buy upstream assets — at the bottom of the alumina cycle, with refinery stability (Pinjarra) demonstrably returning and $34 of Q2 unit cost already worked back down to $354. The bear case is that the cycle, not management, sets that spread, and Alcoa just levered the balance sheet — long-term debt nearly doubled in nine months to $4.82 billion — to increase its sensitivity to a price it cannot control.
There is a smaller, stranger deal worth noting. Alcoa signed definitive agreements to sell portions of its Massena East site in New York for data-center development: roughly $50–65 million at closing plus up to $250 million more in capacity-based payments over seven years. An aluminum company selling land to data centers is a curiosity, not a thesis — but $315 million of potential proceeds against a $4.8 billion debt load is not nothing, and it shows a management team willing to monetize anything that is not a smelter or a refinery.
The fourth-quarter outlook guides to more of the same operationally — higher production and shipments in both segments, Alumina EBITDA flat sequentially, Aluminum EBITDA pressured by about $60 million of raw-material, maintenance, and alumina-cost headwinds — plus $20 million more other income from interest on the AliGroup cash pile. The cash earns while it waits. The question is what it buys.
Tracking a $4.4B Cash Pile in Plain Text
A commodity company's earnings release asks you to hold six numbers in your head at once — price, cost, shipments, special items, debt, and cash — and trust that they reconcile. Double-entry bookkeeping refuses that trust: every dollar must come from somewhere and go somewhere, so the model either ties or it doesn't. That discipline is the point of how we model every company. Here is Alcoa's third quarter as one zero-sum transaction, exactly as validated and pushed (income negative as a credit, expenses positive as a debit, the offset proving the sum is zero):
; FY2026Q3 Income Statement — three months ended September 30, 2026
; Check: −3,704 + 2,822 + 97 + 8 + 176 + 18 + 42 + (−32) + 91 + (−1) + 483 = 0 ✓
2026-09-30 * "Alcoa Corporation" "FY2026Q3 Income Statement"
Income:Revenue -3704 MUSD ; sales
Expenses:CostOfRevenue 2822 MUSD ; cost of goods sold
Expenses:SellingGeneralAdministrative 97 MUSD ; selling, general administrative, and other expenses
Expenses:ResearchAndDevelopment 8 MUSD ; research and development expenses
Expenses:DepreciationAndAmortization 176 MUSD ; provision for depreciation, depletion, and amortization
Expenses:OtherNet 18 MUSD ; restructuring and other charges, net
Expenses:Interest 42 MUSD ; interest expense
Income:OtherNet -32 MUSD ; other income, net (incl. mark-to-market gains on energy contracts 32 and the Ma'aden shares 28 — see the release's special-items footnote for the full bridge)
Expenses:IncomeTax 91 MUSD ; provision for income taxes
Expenses:OtherNet -1 MUSD ; net loss attributable to noncontrolling interest, added back as the filing does
Equity:Adjustments 483 MUSD ; net income attributable to Alcoa Corporation offset (RE set by balance assertion)That block is not an illustration; it is the period that was validated and pushed to open_ledger/alcoa, where assets of $20,362M equal liabilities of $12,117M plus equity of $8,245M to the million the release prints. The one balance-sheet number that tells the narrative is cash of $4,408 million — up $2,811 million in nine months, funded almost dollar for dollar by $2,372 million of net new debt. Strip out the acquisition financing and this is a $1.8 billion cash company with $2.4 billion of debt; with it, a $4.4 billion cash company with $4.8 billion of debt, waiting on a closing date. A second number deserves a glance: retained earnings of $964 million — positive for the first time in this ledger's six periods, the accumulated deficit of the 2021–2024 years finally earned back.
The Multi-Year Arc
Six periods of ledger tell the story of a commodity cycle survived, then monetized, then — maybe — repeated at larger scale:
| Period | Revenue | Net income | Net margin | Diluted EPS | Segment Adj. EBITDA | Cash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2021 | $12,152M | $429M | 3.5% | $2.26 | $3,071M | $1,814M |
| FY2022 | $12,451M | $(123)M | -1.0% | $(0.68) | $2,280M | $1,363M |
| FY2023 | $10,551M | $(651)M | -6.2% | $(3.65) | $734M | $944M |
| FY2024 | $11,895M | $60M | 0.5% | $0.26 | $2,065M | $1,138M |
| FY2025 | $12,831M | $1,157M | 9.0% | $4.37 | $1,940M | $1,597M |
| 9M 2026 | $10,863M | $1,315M | 12.1% | $4.95 | $2,492M | $4,408M |
Three acts. Act one (2021–2023): the trough. Revenue sagged to $10.6 billion, the company lost $651 million in 2023, and $696 million then $184 million of restructuring charges recorded the pain of smelter curtailments and closures. Act two (2024–2025): the repair. The August 2024 Alumina Limited acquisition consolidated the AWAC joint venture — watch the noncontrolling interest vanish from equity and additional capital jump $2.4 billion on the shares issued — and the July 2025 sale of the Saudi Arabia joint venture crystallized a $786 million gain plus $1.4 billion of Ma'aden shares. But read FY2025 carefully: $1,057 million of other income against $918 million of restructuring charges. The record $1,157 million profit was substantially two one-offs netting against each other, not operations.
Act three (2026) is the question this ledger will answer over the next year: nine-month net income of $1,315 million already exceeds all of FY2025, driven this time by aluminum segment earnings rather than asset sales — yet the balance sheet is being re-levered to buy AliGroup before act two's cash has even cooled. Revenue is on pace for a record year near $14.5 billion, and the company is spending the moment of maximum strength the way cyclical companies always do: acquiring.
The Verdict: Bull vs. Bear
Bull Case
- The aluminum franchise is earning at scale. $862 million of quarterly segment EBITDA at a 28.5% margin, production up six quarters in a row, and record output at five smelters — the operating turnaround is measured in tons, not adjectives.
- Alumina costs are rolling over. Unit cost fell from $368 to $354 in one quarter on refinery stability; if price holds near $353 and cost keeps falling, the segment re-enters profit and the AliGroup assets arrive into a recovering spread.
- The balance sheet earns while it waits. $4.4 billion of cash against $4.8 billion of debt is net debt of just $414 million, and the acquisition cash earns interest (plus $20 million guided for Q4) until closing.
- Capital is being returned through the cycle. $80 million of common dividends in nine months plus a retained-earnings surplus rebuilt from a $1.3 billion deficit — the ledger shows a company that dug out and stayed disciplined.
- AliGroup is counter-cyclical buying. Acquiring upstream assets when the alumina spread is zero is how the best cyclical deals look at signing; South32 shareholder approval is secured and the financing is funded.
Bear Case
- Alumina earns nothing and Alcoa is buying more of it. Negative $1 million of segment EBITDA on $680 million of sales is the current return on the integrated model, and $3.1 billion of cash plus new shares will deepen that exposure into H1 2027.
- $60 million of Q4 headwinds are already guided. Raw materials, maintenance, and alumina costs hit the Aluminum segment next quarter — the engine pays for the caboose.
- Debt doubled in nine months. Long-term debt went from $2.44 billion to $4.82 billion, interest guidance rose to $185 million for the year, and the 6.625–6.875% coupons on the new notes price real cyclical risk.
- Management says nothing about demand. Zero demand, supply, or pricing-momentum language in the release — no signal in the scan means no cover if the LME turns; the 2023 loss of $651 million is two years old.
- One-offs still flatter the trailing numbers. FY2025's record profit needed a $786 million asset-sale gain; Q3's GAAP beat needed $60 million of mark-to-market gains. Strip the financial engineering and this is a mid-cycle aluminum smelter, priced as more.
Our Take
Alcoa did everything right this quarter except the thing it cannot control: it ran its plants superbly, funded its acquisition cheaply relative to the risk, and sold a power-plant site to data centers for good measure. But the investment case now rests on a single belief — that the alumina spread recovers before the AliGroup deal closes and turns a counter-cyclical coup into a pro-cyclical top. The ledger gives that belief a number to watch: $354 of cost against $353 of price. When the spread turns sustainably positive, the deal thesis has its first confirmation. Until then, this is a well-run smelter holding $4.4 billion of somebody else's money, waiting on a closing date. We are constructive on the operations, skeptical of the timing, and watching the spread.





