Comcast Q3 2026 Earnings: Peacock's $261M Profit Meets Broadband's 144,000 Losses

On October 22, 2026, Comcast reported third-quarter revenue of $29.3 billion, down 6.1% — alongside net income attributable to Comcast of $3.4 billion, up 3.5%. Both numbers are distorted by the same event: the Versant cable-networks spin-off that closed January 2 took $1.7 billion of quarterly revenue out of the comparison, so on the pro forma basis Comcast discloses, revenue grew 0.5% and Adjusted EBITDA grew 0.8%. Strip the portfolio surgery and this is a flat quarter with a split personality — the connectivity business being kept shrank, the content business being spun grew 29% — nine months before the company divides in two.

The Headline Numbers​

Comcast's fiscal year is the calendar year; Q3 2026 ended September 30, 2026. Every figure below comes from the Form 10-Q and the earnings release (Exhibit 99.1 to the Form 8-K), filed the same day.

Net income here is attributable to Comcast, the number the release headlines; consolidated net income was $3,362 million, with the net loss attributable to noncontrolling interests leaving $3,448 million attributable. Read the revenue line as reported and the quarter looks like decline; read it pro forma — as if Versant and the sold Sky Germany operations had left on January 1, 2024 — and the remaining business grew revenue 0.5% with Adjusted EBITDA up 0.8%. The 10-Q names the moving parts explicitly: down on the Versant separation, down on the Sky Germany sale, down in Connectivity & Platforms, partly offset by growth in Content & Experiences. Flat is the honest word.

Below the operating line, three things pushed in GAAP's favor while adjusted earnings fell 7.3%. Amortization dropped 21.1% to $1,314 million as the separated Versant intangibles stopped amortizing — customer relationships alone lost $9.0 billion of gross carrying amount in the spin. Interest expense fell 14.7% to $962 million on nine months of deleveraging: total debt is down to $87.4 billion from $98.9 billion at year-end, including $2.75 billion of notes redeemed in January with the Versant separation cash. And the effective tax rate came in at 24.4% against 27.3% a year ago. EPS growing 7.2% while net income grew 3.5% is the last echo of the buyback — diluted shares fell 3.5% year over year before Comcast suspended repurchases entirely in Q3, a pause that stays in place through the separation.

Revenue Deep Dive​

Comcast resegmented effective Q1 2026, and the new map is the spin map: Residential Connectivity & Platforms and Business Services Connectivity are what Comcast keeps; Media, Studios and Theme Parks are what it spins.

Residential connectivity is the company being kept, and it shrank on both ends of its core product. Domestic broadband revenue fell 4.7% to $6,241 million "due to lower average rates and a decline in the number of domestic broadband customers" — 144,000 net losses, worse than the 91,000 lost a year ago, with penetration sliding to 47.5% of passings from 49.3%. Video fell 8.7% on 274,000 customer losses. The offsets are real but smaller: domestic wireless service up 14.7% on base growth "and the conversion of promotional free lines to paid service," wireless equipment up 43.6% on device sales, international connectivity (Sky UK/Italy) up 3.1%, advertising up 2.9% on political and advanced-ads strength. Nearly 45% of broadband customers are now on gig-plus speed tiers, up nearly ten points in a year, and premium unlimited plans took about 40% of postpaid phone connects — the base is narrowing toward higher-value products even as it shrinks. Segment EBITDA fell 5.8% with margin down 90 basis points to 35.9%, which the release attributes to "the investment in our go-to-market strategy" — the free-wireless-line-for-a-year offer and repriced broadband that are buying the wireless funnel with broadband margin.

Business services is the quiet compounder: revenue up 2.7% "primarily due to an increase in revenue from enterprise solutions offerings," EBITDA up 1.7%, and a 55.9% margin — the highest in the company by twenty points. If the kept company has a growth engine that is not a defensive bundle, this is it.

Media is the quarter's fireworks: revenue up 13.0%, EBITDA tripling from $247 million to $769 million. Two adjustments keep it honest. First, $224 million of the revenue is the FIFA World Cup; ex-WC growth is 8.3%. Second, the advertising line is two stories: domestic advertising up 14.6% headline but just 0.3% ex-WC, "reflecting higher revenue at Peacock, offset by lower revenue at our networks." The structural win is distribution, up 22.4% on Peacock rates and subscribers. Peacock itself did $1.8 billion of revenue (from $1.4 billion) with $261 million of EBITDA against a $217 million loss — a $478 million year-over-year swing, its second consecutive profitable quarter, with paid subscribers up 17% to 48 million. A streamer that was a thesis is now a contributor.

Studios fell 1.1% on the timing of television content licensing (-23.7%) while theatrical surged 76.6% on The Odyssey — nearly $1.8 billion at the box office, Universal's highest-grossing film ever — plus Minions & Monsters and the Obsession carryover. Universal became the first studio past $5 billion at the global box office in 2026. EBITDA rose 18.6% because expenses fell faster than revenue. Theme parks went the other way: revenue down 4.4% on softer admissions "including from the impact of increased promotional activity," EBITDA down 17.1% as domestic operating costs rose — the Epic Universe cost base, opened May 2025, meeting cyclical attendance.

On the management-signal scan, this release talks satisfaction and transformation, not demand or pricing power. Co-CEOs Brian Roberts and Mike Cavanagh cite "improving customer satisfaction, strong conversion of free wireless lines to paid relationships, growing adoption of premium wireless plans" and "healthy growth in Business Services, led by Enterprise, where there is substantial opportunity ahead." There is no "demand exceeds supply," no upcycle language, no tight-supply wording — and the pricing signal runs negative: broadband revenue fell on "lower average rates" while parks leaned on promotions. The operating mantra is the tell: "we're transforming our operations to move faster, improve efficiency and fully capitalize on the strength of our businesses." That is separation-prep language, and the ledger line that will confirm or contradict it over the next three quarters is residential non-programming expense, which rose 1.2% this quarter instead of falling.

The Margin Story​

* 9M 2025 net margin holds the $7.1 billion after-tax Hulu-sale gain.

The Q3 margin story is genuinely good: operating margin expanded half a point to 18.2% in a down-revenue quarter because costs fell 6.6% against revenue's 6.1% decline. The mechanics are mix, not magic — programming and production down 13.2% as Versant exited and Peacock programming costs fell, amortization down 21.1% on the separated intangibles — plus Media EBITDA tripling while the shrinking residential base shed its variable cost. Net margin widened a full point on the lower interest and tax lines. The nine-month comparison looks worse only because 9M 2025's net margin is flattered by Hulu; on Adjusted EBITDA the 9M margin is 28.6% against 32.3%, the Versant-shaped hole plus the go-to-market investment.

The GAAP to non-GAAP bridge is converging, and that is worth showing in full:

A year ago the acquisition-amortization add-back was $633 million; now it is $402 million, because the Versant intangibles left the building. The entire $0.10 per-share gap between GAAP and adjusted EPS is nearly that one line plus small separation costs — Comcast's two earnings are becoming one earnings, which is what should happen when a serial acquirer stops acquiring and starts dividing.

The One Big Question: Is the Right Half Being Kept?​

In June 2026 Comcast announced it will separate into two independent public companies through the tax-free spin-off of NBCUniversal and Sky — "comprised primarily of the Media, Studios and Theme Parks segments and the Sky businesses" — expected mid-2027 subject to board approval, tax opinions, regulatory approvals and financing. Comcast would keep up to 19.9% of the spinco for up to a year to monetize "in a tax-efficient manner." The Q3 print is the first clean quarter both halves auditioned separately, and the audition has an awkward result:

The half being spun grew EBITDA 29%; the half being kept shrank it 4%. The bull case for the split is that these numbers describe different assets deserving different multiples: a 38.6%-margin connectivity annuity whose value is durability, and a content business whose value is growth. The bear case is that the kept half's durability is exactly what is eroding — broadband losing 144,000 subs a quarter at falling average rates, video losing 274,000, penetration down nearly two points in a year — while the spun half's growth is part cyclical (a $224 million World Cup quarter, an Odyssey-sized theatrical slate, parks already -17% on promotions).

What is not in doubt is the commitment. Comcast booked $22 million of transaction costs and $4 million of transaction-related costs for the spin this quarter, suspended the buyback "beginning in the third quarter" through the separation, and says the split "remains on track to create two independent companies with the financial strength and flexibility to pursue their respective growth strategies." With $87.4 billion of debt against $92.5 billion of equity, how that leverage is divided between the two companies — the filing promises only "completion of financing arrangements" — is the single most important number Comcast has not yet disclosed. Everything else in this quarter is preamble to that capital structure.

Tracking a $29.3B Quarter in Plain Text​

A conglomerate mid-split is where segment reporting goes to confuse — five segments, two groupings, pro forma overlays, and a spin that moves the walls between them — and double-entry bookkeeping forces every dollar of it to reconcile. That is why this ledger exists, and how we model every company documents the conventions. The ledger covers FY2024 through FY2026Q3; history starts at FY2024, the earliest audited year this bootstrap models, and both annuals include Versant while the quarter excludes it.

Here is the quarter's income statement exactly as the ledger records it — income negative, expenses positive, summing to zero:

; FY2026Q3 Income Statement — three months ended September 30, 2026
; Check: −29,298 + 7,515 + 2,119 + 10,645 + 2,385 + 1,314 + 962 − 88 + 1,084 − 86 + 3,448 = 0 ✓
 
2026-09-30 * "Comcast Corporation" "FY2026Q3 Income Statement"
  Income:Revenue                         -29298 MUSD  ; revenue
  Expenses:CostOfRevenue                   7515 MUSD  ; programming and production
  Expenses:SellingGeneralAdministrative    2119 MUSD  ; marketing and promotion
  Expenses:SellingGeneralAdministrative   10645 MUSD  ; other operating and administrative
  Expenses:DepreciationAndAmortization     2385 MUSD  ; depreciation
  Expenses:DepreciationAndAmortization     1314 MUSD  ; amortization
  Expenses:Interest                         962 MUSD  ; interest expense
  Income:OtherNet                            -88 MUSD  ; investment and other income, net
  Expenses:IncomeTax                       1084 MUSD  ; income tax expense
  Expenses:OtherNet                          -86 MUSD  ; less: net loss attributable to noncontrolling interests (filed 87; −1 rounding so the transaction sums to reported attributable net income 3,448)
  Equity:Adjustments                       3448 MUSD  ; net income attributable to Comcast Corporation offset (RE set by balance assertion; consolidated net income 3,362)

The one balance-sheet number that tells the separation story is goodwill: $61,502 million in December, $53,239 million in September, down $8,263 million — $7.7 billion walked out the door with Versant plus currency translation. Against it sits the number that never moves: $59,365 million of cable franchise rights, the licenses under the entire connectivity business, held since FY2024 to the dollar and never amortized. Between them they are the split in miniature — the portable goodwill leaving, the permanent licenses staying.

The Multi-Year Arc​

Revenue has been flat at roughly $123.7 billion for three years while operating income sagged from $23.3 billion to $20.7 billion — the slow grind of video and broadband erosion against content growth. Yet attributable net income rose 30% and EPS 45%, and every dollar of that outperformance came from below the operating line: FY2024's $2,796 million tax provision held a $1,920 million internal-reorganization benefit (a 15.0% effective rate), FY2025's $9,503 million of investment income held the $9.4 billion pre-tax Hulu-sale gain, and the share count shrank 11% from 3.97 billion to 3.54 billion on buybacks. This was an EPS compounder powered by capital return and one-offs, not by growth — and with the buyback now suspended through the mid-2027 split and the Hulu proceeds long banked, that engine is off. What replaces it is deleveraging: total debt down $11.6 billion in nine months to $87.4 billion, interest falling 15% year over year, and $4.2 billion of quarterly free cash flow covering the $1.2 billion dividend more than three times over. The arc bends from financial engineering to balance-sheet repair, which is the right shape for a company about to divide its leverage in two.

The Verdict: Bull vs. Bear​

Bull Case

• Ex-separations the business is stable, not shrinking: pro forma revenue +0.5% and pro forma Adjusted EBITDA +0.8% say the -6.1% headline is portfolio surgery.
• Peacock's inflection is real and large: a $478 million year-over-year EBITDA swing to +$261 million, 48 million paid subs up 17%, and distribution revenue up 22.4% on rates and subs.
• Wireless has years of runway at 368,000 quarterly adds with only 18% penetration of the broadband base and 7% of addressable lines — plus business services compounding at a 55.9% margin.
• Deleveraging is accelerating: debt down $11.6 billion in nine months, interest down 14.7%, and quarterly free cash flow covers the dividend 3.5×.
• The split unlocks sum-of-parts: a 38.6%-margin connectivity annuity and a 29%-EBITDA-growth content business will not trade at one multiple.

Bear Case

• Broadband is shrinking on volume and price at once: -144,000 subs (worse than -91,000), penetration 47.5% vs 49.3%, and "lower average rates" — no pricing-power signal anywhere in the release.
• Video loses 274,000 customers a quarter, and the programming-cost decline (-8.3%) only just tracks the revenue decline (-8.7%); affiliate-fee leverage cuts the other way if cord-cutting accelerates.
• The spun half's quarter is flattered: $224 million of World Cup revenue that will not repeat, an Odyssey-sized theatrical slate, and parks EBITDA already -17% on promotional admissions.
• The buyback suspension through mid-2027 kills the EPS engine that shrank shares 11% since 2023; until the split, holders get the dividend and multiple compression risk.
• Media advertising ex-World Cup is flat (+0.3%) with linear networks declining — Peacock's growth is still filling a hole, not yet digging new ground.

Our Take: the numbers say split it, and management is. A 38.6%-margin connectivity business shrinking 2–3% a year and a hit-driven content business growing EBITDA 29% on a World Cup quarter should never have shared a cost of capital, and the $26 million of separation costs this quarter is the cheapest money Comcast will spend. But do not mistake the direction for the destination: the kept company's entire investment case now rests on broadband losses stabilizing before mid-2027, because a connectivity annuity losing 500,000-plus subs a year at falling rates prices like a melting ice cube no wireless attach rate can fully offset. Peacock's $261 million, the Odyssey, and the deleveraging are real wins — and nearly all of them belong to the company being spun away.